Team:SDU-Denmark/Tour34

From 2014.igem.org

(Difference between revisions)
 
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</div><br><br>
</div><br><br>
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<span class="intro">As for the risk</span> for the safety and health to the general public, it is of great concern to avoid the spread of antibiotic
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<span class="intro">As for the risk</span> for the safety and health of the general public, it is of great concern to avoid the spread of antibiotic
resistance. All our constructs are made on antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which could, potentially, transfer resistance  
resistance. All our constructs are made on antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which could, potentially, transfer resistance  
-
genes to other bacteria, in case of slippage. This would contribute to the increasing difficulty in fighting so far  
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genes to other bacteria, in case of leakage. This would contribute to the increasing difficulty in fighting so far  
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controlled infections. To avoid this, we thought that in a future these genes could be transferred into a plasmid  
+
controlled infections. To avoid this, we think that in the future these genes could be transferred into a plasmid  
developed in our university, which contains the proteins needed to make ribosomes and use <i>E. coli</i> knocked down  
developed in our university, which contains the proteins needed to make ribosomes and use <i>E. coli</i> knocked down  
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for these genes. In this way is the bacteria completely dependent of the plasmid in order to survive, which can be  
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for these genes. In this way the bacteria is completely dependent of the plasmid in order to survive, which can be  
used as an alternative method of selection.<br><br>
used as an alternative method of selection.<br><br>
</p>
</p>
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<h4>Dual use</h4>
<h4>Dual use</h4>
<p>
<p>
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<span class="intro">If the product was to be mis-used</span> by individuals, groups or countries, could they potentially use this bacterium to  
+
<span class="intro">If the product was to be misused</span> by individuals, groups or countries, they could potentially use this bacterium to  
induce the right combination of mutations, in order to get a plant-destruction weapon. We evaluate that the risk  
induce the right combination of mutations, in order to get a plant-destruction weapon. We evaluate that the risk  
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involved in the mis-use of our project is actually smaller than the mis-use of the cellulase biobrick in itself (because  
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involved in the misuse of our project is actually smaller than the misuse of the cellulase biobrick itself (because  
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of the killing switch, need of mutating the promoter, etc.)<br><br>
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of the kill switch, need of mutation of the promoter, etc.)<br><br>
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<span class="intro">The mis-use of our protein</span> might be aimed at mutating the protein to make it harmful. We consider, though, that if the aim is to create a harmful protein, there are other easier ways, such as starting with a pathogenic protein  
+
<span class="intro">The misuse of our protein</span> might be aimed at mutating the protein to make it harmful. We consider, though, that if the aim is to create a harmful protein there are other easier ways, such as starting with a pathogenic protein  
or simply designing a protein.<br><br>
or simply designing a protein.<br><br>
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<span class="intro">The best way to fight</span> dual use, is to try to prevent it, by taking biosecurity measures in consideration, like limited  
+
<span class="intro">The best way to fight</span> dual use is to try to prevent it by taking biosecurity measures in consideration, like limited  
access to laboratories and tracking of orders of gene synthesis.<br><br>
access to laboratories and tracking of orders of gene synthesis.<br><br>
</p>
</p>
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<h4>Risk perspection: including others</h4>
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<h4>Risk perspectives: including others</h4>
<p>
<p>
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<span class="intro">It is our conviction,</span> that a good synthetic biologist (and scientist) is the one that, besides evaluating the safety of his projects, include the general public into the discussion. Public opinion has an enormous effect on the feasibility  
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<span class="intro">It is our conviction</span> that a good synthetic biologist (and scientist) is one that, besides evaluating the safety of his projects, can include the general public into the discussion. Public opinion has an enormous effect on the feasibility  
of a project to succeed, both because the acceptance of the general public can make it easier to receive funding,  
of a project to succeed, both because the acceptance of the general public can make it easier to receive funding,  
but also because of the valuable feedback that can come as a result of the interaction between the general public  
but also because of the valuable feedback that can come as a result of the interaction between the general public  
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and the synthetic biologist. Therefore it is important to <b>communicate</b> effectively and <b>considerate</b>, what might  
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and the synthetic biologist. Therefore it is important to <b>communicate</b> effectively and <b>considerate</b>, what might be
-
perceived as a risk factor. In our case, is bacteria and GMOs often considered as hazardous, and not as a food  
+
perceived as a risk factor. In our case, bacteria and GMOs are often considered as hazardous and not as a food  
-
resource. The fact many people are not familiar with bacteria and GMO, could make the risk perception very high.  
+
resource. The fact that many people are not familiar with bacteria and GMO could make the risk perception very high.  
-
To cope with this issue, we made our interactive video adventure, as an attempt to share the message, inform the  
+
To cope with this issue we made our interactive video adventure as an attempt to share the message, inform the  
general public and, hopefully, reduce the risk perception of our project.<br><br>
general public and, hopefully, reduce the risk perception of our project.<br><br>
-
<span class="intro">All in all, we believe</span> that, even though there could potentially be some risks related to our project, it is safe enough to continue with our project, especially in the light of the potential and much more probable benefits.
+
<span class="intro">All in all, we believe</span> that, even though there could potentially be some risks related to our project, it is safe enough to continue with our project, especially in the light of the potential and more probable benefits.
<br><br><br>
<br><br><br>

Latest revision as of 01:37, 18 October 2014

Safety

"With great power comes great responsibility!" - Voltaire

The role of a synthetic biologist involves the analysis of the biosafety of the systems designed. Biosafety is the prevention of an accidental or unintentional exposure to pathogens, and to analyze this it is useful to evaluate the risk involved in the project which can be expressed as “Risk= Hazard x Probability”. Source: iGEM, 2013: Safety form Resources. (Link)

Hazard

To evaluate the potential hazardousness of our project, we started by looking at the components of the system. Our main chassis, E.coli K12 MG1655 is a non-pathogen E.coli strain. Source: NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT OR SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES. 2013. (Link) Further more, it is weakened and thereby not able to survive in case of leakage. We have also been working with the Odor Free chassis E.coli YYC912, which is a modified strain, not able to produce indole. This strain is non-pathogen as well. Source: Genportal, 2006. (Link) Our parts, both basic parts and devices, are all taken from risk group 1 organisms and therefore do not contain nor mimic any virulence factors. This would be indicative of a very low hazardousness of our system. On the other hand, we have a self-designed protein and the safety of this brick might need to be considered. To avoid toxicity, we have shuffled the amino acids until the obtained sequence didn’t resemble any known toxin or other disease causing protein. We have also assayed the toxicity by feeding C. elegans bacteria producing OneProt (For more information, see our results page).

Probability

When analyzing the probability it is important to consider that there always will be an element of uncertainty in the results. The completion of our project implies the release of GMO to the environment. Even though our GMO will be weakened in several ways, the environmental effect of this release cannot be completely foreseen.

Risk

Our final product would include a group of cellulases, this could mean that there would be a remote risk that, in case of leakage, our bacteria could start to uncontrollably degrade cellulose into glucose for satisfying its own metabolic requirements. In this sense these bacteria could potentially become a threat for crops and other plants. To manage this, our idea is to have the cellulases regulated by an inducible promoter, which will prevent the production of cellulase in the absence of the inducer. In a worst-case scenario this promoter could mutate to become constitutive active and thereby produce cellulase. Even if this was the case, other safety mechanisms would still be active, such as the kill switch and the general low environmental stability of E.coli K12. The probability of all these factors randomly mutating/failing at the same time is almost negligible. We can analyze the risk of this event by using a risk matrix:

Risk matrix: This describes relation between the probability and the hazard of our project. According to this analysis is this risk “yellow”, which means that it is acceptable to work with this project, but some considerations, such as a kill switch, may be considered.


As for the risk for the safety and health of the general public, it is of great concern to avoid the spread of antibiotic resistance. All our constructs are made on antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which could, potentially, transfer resistance genes to other bacteria, in case of leakage. This would contribute to the increasing difficulty in fighting so far controlled infections. To avoid this, we think that in the future these genes could be transferred into a plasmid developed in our university, which contains the proteins needed to make ribosomes and use E. coli knocked down for these genes. In this way the bacteria is completely dependent of the plasmid in order to survive, which can be used as an alternative method of selection.

Dual use

If the product was to be misused by individuals, groups or countries, they could potentially use this bacterium to induce the right combination of mutations, in order to get a plant-destruction weapon. We evaluate that the risk involved in the misuse of our project is actually smaller than the misuse of the cellulase biobrick itself (because of the kill switch, need of mutation of the promoter, etc.)

The misuse of our protein might be aimed at mutating the protein to make it harmful. We consider, though, that if the aim is to create a harmful protein there are other easier ways, such as starting with a pathogenic protein or simply designing a protein.

The best way to fight dual use is to try to prevent it by taking biosecurity measures in consideration, like limited access to laboratories and tracking of orders of gene synthesis.

Risk perspectives: including others

It is our conviction that a good synthetic biologist (and scientist) is one that, besides evaluating the safety of his projects, can include the general public into the discussion. Public opinion has an enormous effect on the feasibility of a project to succeed, both because the acceptance of the general public can make it easier to receive funding, but also because of the valuable feedback that can come as a result of the interaction between the general public and the synthetic biologist. Therefore it is important to communicate effectively and considerate, what might be perceived as a risk factor. In our case, bacteria and GMOs are often considered as hazardous and not as a food resource. The fact that many people are not familiar with bacteria and GMO could make the risk perception very high. To cope with this issue we made our interactive video adventure as an attempt to share the message, inform the general public and, hopefully, reduce the risk perception of our project.

All in all, we believe that, even though there could potentially be some risks related to our project, it is safe enough to continue with our project, especially in the light of the potential and more probable benefits.