Team:ETH Zurich/human/interviews/expert1

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On the other hand we have the subjective way of describing processes occurring in our mind. The latter leads to a description in the first form singular where we have the means of language to describe processes of the mind.  
On the other hand we have the subjective way of describing processes occurring in our mind. The latter leads to a description in the first form singular where we have the means of language to describe processes of the mind.  
For me there exists a gap between the science of neurobiology and the subjective way of describing phenomena of our minds.  
For me there exists a gap between the science of neurobiology and the subjective way of describing phenomena of our minds.  
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===Can you please give us a citation or personal definition of complexity?===
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#What comes into my mind are two of four theses in John Searle’s book ‘Mind: a brief introduction’.
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## Conscious states, with their subjective, first-person ontology, are real phenomena in the real world. We cannot do an eliminative reduction of consciousness, showing that it is just an illusion. Nor can we reduce consciousness to its neurobiological basis, because such a third-person reduction would leave out the first-person ontology of consciousness.
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## Conscious states are entirely caused by lower level neurobiological processes in the brain. Conscious states are thus causally reducible to neurobiological processes. They have absolutely no life of their own, independent of the neurobiology. Causally speaking, they are not something “over and above” neurobiological processes.
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Source: John R. Searle, Oxford university press; Mind: a brief introduction, 2004
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I am here citing Searle because in my opinion a correct description of the world includes a ‘weak’ form of dualism, we simply cannot deal without it. With this weak dualism I do not mean the dualism described by Descartes with res extensa and res cogitans. Moreover I am talking about the comprehension that temporarily we do not have the measurement categories to create a theoretical continuum between first-person descriptions of phenomena of consciousness and third-person descriptions of neuronal processes delivered by neurosciences. At this moment we have the situation of incommensurability and it is not clear to which extent we will be able to overcome this in theory.
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Revision as of 11:32, 9 October 2014

iGEM ETH Zurich 2014