Introduction

The full definition of bioweapon (later referred to as BW) as given by the Merriam-Webster online dictionary is as follows:

"a harmful biological agent (as a pathogenic microorganism or a neurotoxin) used as a weapon to cause death or disease usually on a large scale" (1)

This is a broad definition including naturally occurring toxins and pathogens, as well as those specifically engineered to cause disruption and/or death. However, biological warfare is usually discussed as distinct from nuclear and chemical warfare, which together form the triumvirate of terror given by the military acronym NBC. A bioweapon may be lethal or non-lethal, in the latter case having, for example, a primary purpose of debilitation, and may be targeted at individuals, small groups or entire populations. Associated phrases include biodefense, biowar and bioterrorism. (2)

The distinction between chemical and biological agents is sometimes subtle; for example, toxic products of living organisms, such as ricin, may be considered dangerous chemical agents, where the organisms themselves, in this case the castor oil plant, do not qualify as the biological equivalent. This is evident from the fact that we produce more than 1 million tonnes of castor beans every year. All such weapons have the potential to be labelled as weapons of mass destruction, or ‘WMD’s. (3)

A Short Historical Account

The use of biological agents as a tool of war has been with us since antiquity. Its most significant initial use in modern times was to enforce colonialism; for example, smallpox was likely disseminated by the British Marines to quell opposition to their settling of New South Wales by the native population in 1789. Similarly, smallpox-infected blankets were handed out to Native Americans by the British in the 1760s, including in times of peace. (4)

The devastating power of bioweapons was recognised properly at the beginning of the 20th century, with the advent of international agreements that criminalised certain wartime behaviours, called the Hague Conventions (in 1899 and 1907). These regulated the use of BW via a clause prohibiting signatories from using projectiles with the capacity to spread ‘asphyxiating poisonous gases’. All major powers ratified this doctrine except for the United States, infamous for unilaterally eschewing international regulation. After the Great War, it was felt that further clarification of this point was needed, perhaps given the extensive use of mustard gas by the Germans, and this resulted in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which extended the Hague Conventions to prohibit generally the use of ‘bacteriological methods’ in warfare (signed by the US 50 years later). (5,6)

There are many criticisms to be levied at this agreement, most specifically its lack of application to non-ratifying countries, and failure to prohibit the stockpiling of BWs and their use in civil/domestic contexts. This protocol did not, for example, prohibit the extensive development and weaponisation of toxins by the Allied forces in World War II, including but not limited to tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism. We are fortunate that these were never deployed, largely due to the threat of retaliation which made it strategic suicide, similar to the ‘mutually assured destruction’ reasoning prevalent during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Geneva Protocol is now considered part of so-called ‘customary international law’; that is, law that should be observed by all responsible and right-acting international actors.

Furthermore, biological and chemical warfare has been a constant spectre in the Middle East in recent decades, from Saddam Hussein’s chemical assault on Kurdish rebels at Halabjah in ’88 to the euphemistic Gulf War Syndrome with which US and Coalition survivors of the first Gulf War were diagnosed in ‘92 (likely a result of the contaminants released from various Iraqi chemical plants and stockpiles when subject to airstrike). As recently as 2013, the Assad regime in Syria was accused of killing hundreds of Syrians in Ghouta using sarin gas. My country, the UK, was guilty of issuing export licenses for chemicals for sarin in January of that year.

It is not just the context of warfare in which this discussion must be had. Another case of the deliberate misuse of biological agents was the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, in which envelopes containing anthrax were delivered to various news offices and Senators, killing five people. In other scenarios, agents are not introduced maliciously but can develop into an epidemic, as with the ebola currently gripping West African nations like Sierra Leone and Liberia, which is exacerbated and perpetuated by events like the theft of infected materials. Malevolent forces may try and harness or reproduce outbreaks of diseases like ebola for ‘evil’. For example, evidence surfaced recently that ISIS, the Islamist militia group, had been trying to weaponise the bubonic plague. (7,8,9,10)

All of this compounds to demonstrate the devastation which anyone capable of engineering and disseminating particular biological agents could inflict upon a population. Synthetic biology, whilst pushing the scientific envelope and extending the frontiers of our ability to manipulate the world around us, creates a unique problem by opening up another avenue for the abuse and ill-purposing of science. With minimal expenditure and an education available entirely online, your average Joe can theoretically build a biological weapon of mass destruction.