Team:WLC-Milwaukee/Safety
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<p> While our team did spend resources trying to integrate a successful kill switch in case the inevitable unforeseeable event were to occur, we realize that kill switches are not completely infallible. Mutations constantly occur in bacteria. Due to these constant mutations, the kill switch coding sequence will eventually have a mutation which will make the plasmid uncontrollable. Therefore, the Sugar Rush team, while unable to encorporate the following safety mechanisms, has considered these other means of ensuring the safety of our project. </p> | <p> While our team did spend resources trying to integrate a successful kill switch in case the inevitable unforeseeable event were to occur, we realize that kill switches are not completely infallible. Mutations constantly occur in bacteria. Due to these constant mutations, the kill switch coding sequence will eventually have a mutation which will make the plasmid uncontrollable. Therefore, the Sugar Rush team, while unable to encorporate the following safety mechanisms, has considered these other means of ensuring the safety of our project. </p> | ||
<p>First, we considered simply adding a second kill switch. This addition would drastically reduce the chances that a mutation would occur and cause problems. This is because both genes are far less likely to be mutated coincidentally within a single organism. Next we considered adding gene flow barriers to prevent conjugation amongst different bacteria. ”Gene-flow barriers are created by including a killer gene in the rDNA and placing the rDNA into an immune host. Immunity from the killer gene is provided by a repressor protein that blocks killer gene expression. If unintended hosts take up the engineered DNA, the lethal gene is decoupled from immunity and the new host cell dies.”2 The final safety mechanism which could be attempted in the future would be to create Auxotrophic cells. This means making cells which are dependant upon something within the target organism (in our case a cow) to live.2 If the cells were ever to escape the organism they would die and not be able to spread due to this organism-specific dependency. (ULRICH SONNENBORN1 & JÜRGEN SCHULZE2)</p> | <p>First, we considered simply adding a second kill switch. This addition would drastically reduce the chances that a mutation would occur and cause problems. This is because both genes are far less likely to be mutated coincidentally within a single organism. Next we considered adding gene flow barriers to prevent conjugation amongst different bacteria. ”Gene-flow barriers are created by including a killer gene in the rDNA and placing the rDNA into an immune host. Immunity from the killer gene is provided by a repressor protein that blocks killer gene expression. If unintended hosts take up the engineered DNA, the lethal gene is decoupled from immunity and the new host cell dies.”2 The final safety mechanism which could be attempted in the future would be to create Auxotrophic cells. This means making cells which are dependant upon something within the target organism (in our case a cow) to live.2 If the cells were ever to escape the organism they would die and not be able to spread due to this organism-specific dependency. (ULRICH SONNENBORN1 & JÜRGEN SCHULZE2)</p> | ||
- | <p> | + | <p>references <br /> <div class="ref" |
Sonneborn, Ulrich; Schulze, Jurgen. The non-pathogenic Escherichia coli strain Nissle 1917 – features of a versatile probiotic. Microbial Ecology in Health and Disease [online] 2009; 21, 124-126. <http://www.microbecolhealthdis.net/index.php/mehd/article/viewFile/7512/8855>. (accessed Aug 24, 2014) <br /> | Sonneborn, Ulrich; Schulze, Jurgen. The non-pathogenic Escherichia coli strain Nissle 1917 – features of a versatile probiotic. Microbial Ecology in Health and Disease [online] 2009; 21, 124-126. <http://www.microbecolhealthdis.net/index.php/mehd/article/viewFile/7512/8855>. (accessed Aug 24, 2014) <br /> | ||
- | Moe-Behrens GH, Davis R, Haynes KA. Preparing synthetic biology for the world. PubMed [online] 2013, 4, 5. <http://library.williams.edu/citing/styles/acs.php>. (accessed Aug 19, 2014)</p> | + | Moe-Behrens GH, Davis R, Haynes KA. Preparing synthetic biology for the world. PubMed [online] 2013, 4, 5. <http://library.williams.edu/citing/styles/acs.php>. (accessed Aug 19, 2014)</div></p> |
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Revision as of 21:59, 15 October 2014