Team:DTU-Denmark/Overview/Ethics
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- | For the products that are not meant to be released in nature, the consequences of accidental release into nature can be minimised by a number of existing biological mechanisms that can be incorporated in the organisms to prevent them from spreading outside the laboratory. Furthermore the probability of accidental release is minimised by the many precautions that are currently required when working with | + | For the products that are not meant to be released in nature, the consequences of accidental release into nature can be minimised by a number of existing biological mechanisms that can be incorporated in the organisms to prevent them from spreading outside the laboratory. Furthermore the probability of accidental release is minimised by the many precautions that are currently required when working with GMOs in the lab (see our <a href="https://2014.igem.org/Team:DTU-Denmark/Methods/Safety" target="_blank">safety page</a>). |
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In light of these considerations we argue that the concern of synthetic organisms disturbing ecosystems is largely unwarranted: Organisms intended to be contained in the laboratory (the vast majority of current synthetic biology products) are already often equipped with kill switches that prevent proliferation in nature, and the containment-requirements of GMO-labs reduce the risk of escape.</br> | In light of these considerations we argue that the concern of synthetic organisms disturbing ecosystems is largely unwarranted: Organisms intended to be contained in the laboratory (the vast majority of current synthetic biology products) are already often equipped with kill switches that prevent proliferation in nature, and the containment-requirements of GMO-labs reduce the risk of escape.</br> | ||
- | Whether to allow the intentional release of | + | Whether to allow the intentional release of GMOs, should depend on an individual assessment of the potential consequences, e.g. how likely is the organism to solve the particular environmental problem, spread to other ecosystems, cause new problems, etc. |
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Revision as of 18:55, 16 October 2014
Introduction
The iGEM team from University of Copenhagen organised an ethics workshop in August 2014 where all the Danish iGEM teams were invited. The workshop provided an introduction to some of the main theories of philosophical ethics and their use regarding synthetic biology. The workshop inspired us to carry out an analysis of the ethical aspects of our chosen project, characterising promoter strengths in absolute terms by means of the RNA aptamer Spinach. Synthetic biology is aiming towards being able to combine known, well-characterised elements into novel constructs. By developing a method for determining absolute promoter strength our project is a step towards realising this vision. Due to the increased possibilities brought by better characterisation and standardisation of promoter strengths several ethical issues arise. Most of these are variations of issues already seen in the ethical debate about synthetic biology in general, including concerns about genetically engineered organisms being released to nature and synthetic biology being used with harmful intentions. These and other arguments will be discussed in the following sections. We have chosen to look at arguments for and against synthetic biology from a utilitarianist point of view when applicable. Utilitarianism have been chosen since it, in contrast to many other ethical theories, allows quantification of different arguments, by analysing the consequences that a given action has on people. In this regard it is also important to be aware of the consequences of not taking an action, which is often referred to as cost of lost potential.
Easier construction of biological systems
Our project aims at developing a method for easier characterisation of essential biological parts, to allow synthetic biologists to better create new and useful biological systems e.g. for producing medicine or cleaning up the environment in a superior manner. Better characterisation of biological parts can, however, in the wrong hands, have hazardous consequences. Improved characterisation of parts will make it easier, even for people with limited knowledge of synthetic biology, to create increasingly sophisticated constructs. Individuals with malicious intentions could for example create biological weapons. This concern is strengthened by the fact that all iGEM material is open source and easily accessed. Easier construction of biological systems can thus potentially have both positive and negative consequences: Well-intentioned use of synthetic biology can lead to better health of the world’s population, solve the environmental problems of the globe etc., while use with bad intentions can lead to disease and possibly death for an unknown number of people. In utilitarianism the weight of a potential consequence is usually quantified by the magnitude of the consequences multiplied by the probability that the given consequence will occur. Since a large number of scientists have good intentions with research in synthetic biology, and (presumably) a comparatively low number of people are trying to create harmful things with synthetic biology, we argue that the positive consequences outweigh the negative consequences. It can also be argued that the better understanding of biology brought about by synthetic biology research will help mitigate the consequences of malicious use of synthetic biology.
Manipulating nature
Another concern commonly raised against synthetic biology (and genetic engineering in general) is that the engineered organisms might escape to nature and disturb the natural ecosystems. With regard to this argument synthetic biology products should be divided in two groups: Those that are intended for release in nature (e.g. bacteria that degrade oil in the oceans) and those that are intended to be kept in a laboratory environment (e.g. strains for producing medicine). For the products that are not meant to be released in nature, the consequences of accidental release into nature can be minimised by a number of existing biological mechanisms that can be incorporated in the organisms to prevent them from spreading outside the laboratory. Furthermore the probability of accidental release is minimised by the many precautions that are currently required when working with GMOs in the lab (see our safety page). The products whose functions do depend on release into nature will inevitably disturb the ecosystem where they are released. However this is often the intention with these products, as they are designed to remedy some already existing ecological imbalance/disturbance. Additionally, prior to releasing an organism into a natural ecosystem it seems prudent to investigate how the organism might affect the ecosystem in question and assess (and minimise) the risk of the organism spreading to other ecosystems, where its presence is not desired. In light of these considerations we argue that the concern of synthetic organisms disturbing ecosystems is largely unwarranted: Organisms intended to be contained in the laboratory (the vast majority of current synthetic biology products) are already often equipped with kill switches that prevent proliferation in nature, and the containment-requirements of GMO-labs reduce the risk of escape. Whether to allow the intentional release of GMOs, should depend on an individual assessment of the potential consequences, e.g. how likely is the organism to solve the particular environmental problem, spread to other ecosystems, cause new problems, etc.
“Playing God”
Another argument that is often presented against synthetic biology is that synthetic biologists are playing God. The argument exists in various formulations depending on the religious and moral values of the person presenting the argument. Common to these arguments is that they suggest that synthetic biology is fiddling with nature in a way that humans should not do. Since the objection put forward with this argument is not related to the consequences of synthetic biology, but rather to the action of performing synthetic biology itself, it is not meaningful to analyse it in terms of utilitarianism. Instead the argument is pertaining more to deontological ethics, which judges the ethicality of an action based on a set of rules that an ethically good action must adhere to. Whether the “playing God” argument is assigned any weight will depend on whether the moral rule-set of a person includes a rule that forbids modifying living organisms, i.e. a religious person might find synthetic biology unacceptable because he considers living organisms God-given, while an atheist synthetic biologist might consider microorganisms as just a complex chemical system, which is acceptable to modify, just as any other chemical system.
Moral status of genetically modified organisms
This argument deals with the question of whether it is acceptable for scientists to use other living organisms as merely a tool for obtaining goals that benefit the human species. In other words it addresses the question of whether the genetically modified organism has a moral status that must be respected by the scientists working with them. Like the “playing God” argument, this argument is difficult to analyse within utilitarianism, and its validity depends on the moral values of a person, i.e. about which organisms or objects in general have a moral status that demands respect. We argue that only organisms that possess conscience should be ascribed a moral status, and since synthetic biology works almost exclusively with plants, microorganisms and cell cultures, we will not discuss it further here. The ethics of synthetic biology on living animals, while interesting, is out of scope of this discussion.
Conclusion
The central question in the present ethical discussion can be seen as a decision between two actions: Practicing synthetic biology, or not practicing synthetic biology. To answer this question, the above arguments can be considered, and in simplistic terms a proactive or precautionist approach can be taken. With a proactive approach the positive consequences of synthetic biology would be given a higher weight, than the negative potentials, and with a precautionist approach, the negative consequences of an action are weighted higher. However in either approach it is difficult to predict all potential consequences of an action. Especially the cost of lost potential, that is the negative consequences of not doing something, can be non-obvious. For synthetic biology, the cost of lost potential would be the negative consequences of not practicing synthetic biology, compared to practising it. The huge range of applications that synthetic biology has and the number of problems it can help solve contribute to the cost of lost potential associated with a decision not to practice synthetic biology. It is our opinion that these costs of lost potential far outweigh the potential negative consequences of synthetic biology. Because of this we think that the practice of synthetic biology is justified, although there are of course issues that must be considered in order to reduce any negative consequences that might arise.